The fall of the Assad regime presents an unusual opportunity to totally reconfigure and realign the entire Mid-East. It is fourteen months since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7th, but since August events throughout the region have been moving rapidly. With the apparent regime change transpiring in Syria, the situation in the region might be ripe for creative efforts at resetting many of the relationships. Many of the players could greatly benefit if they were prepared to move to a constructive and peaceful environment.
Since August Israel has:
*successfully degraded the entire Hezbollah terrorist organization in Lebanon, both its weapon systems, its leadership, its weapons storage as well as its morale;
*almost haphazardly discovered Hamas’ leader, Yahya Sinwar and killed him together with other rebels and strategic forces who had orchestrated the October 7th Hamas attack;
* twice has repulsed Iranian missile and drone attacks while incurring no significant damage;
* successfully counterattacked against Iran damaging many critical Iranian defensive installations and weapon production facilities, while incurring virtually no damage to its own forces; and
* recently appears to have eliminated within a few days Syria’s indigenous military capabilities, including military installations, command headquarters, and most of Syria’s unconventional weapons’ storage facilities.
Progress on the release of the Israelis held hostage by Hamas continues to remain in limbo as well as final movement on a ceasefire. There are, however, voices both from inside the negotiations as well as outside who suggest progress is being made by both the Biden Administration as well as with input from sources within the incoming Trump team.
While Hamas’ persistent intransigence remains inscrutable, the fact that there are political forces within the Israeli coalition who appear to be blocking a resolution is incomprehensible. It has become clear to most observers that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu does not have the desire or the political leverage to effectively gain compliance from the extremist in his right-wing coalition to end the conflict in Gaza, especially considering that his own court deliberations are now underway. In addition, Bibi cannot assuage the ultra-Orthodox (charedi) parties to soften their opposition to military service for their young men. All of which suggests that this coalition could stay in power until the next scheduled elections in October 2026.
The window to change the regional environment might be very brief. At the moment, there is no Syrian Government in place to lead a nation which has lived under the terror of the Assad family for nearly 50 years. It is not clear whether potential political leaders will be dramatically hostile to Israel or whether they will be more interested in economic development and even possible regional cooperation. The speed with which the rebels achieved their takeover continues to amaze observers. While some of the terrorist rebels have strong records of anti-Israel positions, it is not clear if they have become sufficiently politically chaste by regional events to adopt a more pragmatic posture vis-à-vis Israel.
The Government of Turkey desires to gain hegemony once again over Syria (and even Lebanon). There is major concern in the United States and throughout the West that such a move will be extremely dangerous for the U.S. supported Kurds, for continued flow of oil, for Turkey’s continued role in NATO as well as its application for admission to the European Union. It will also represent a major threat for Israel especially should Turkey decide to ally itself with Iran and its aggressive posture towards Israel.
Having found itself embarrassed by Israel’s successful surgical reprisals following Iran’s failed missile/drone attacks against Israel, Iran has only one major option if it wishes to reassert regional leadership. In light of the demise of the Assad regime and the fall of the Iranian anti-Israel crescent of power, it will likely now seek to demonstrate that it has completed work on its nuclear weapons’ development program.
The end of the Assad era in Syria, the weakened Iran, an unpredictable Turkey, and an unresolved war in Gaza now present challenges and opportunities during the inter-regnum period in the U.S. It also suggests that there may well be a possible opportunity for renewed Sunni dominance in the Middle East led by a Saudi interest in moving back on track in the next few months with the Abraham Accords developed at the end of the first Trump Administration.
While the timing of this development would be seriously disappointing to the Biden Administration, it would be a major plus for President-elect Donald Trump, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and the possibility of regional stability. This could develop despite the possibility that Iran would engage in additional saber rattling; especially once the Gaza War is resolved.
コメント